

**INTERNATIONAL PROCESS ON GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION**

**WORKSHOP ON UN ENGAGEMENT WITH REGIONAL, SUB-REGIONAL, AND FUNCTIONAL BODIES AND CIVIL SOCIETY ON IMPLEMENTING THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY**

**17-18 March 2008  
BRATISLAVA, SLOVAKIA**

**WORKSHOP SUMMARY**

**Introduction**

1. On 17 and 18 March 2008 the Government of Slovakia hosted, with funding support from the Government of Germany's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the second workshop in the "International Process on Global Counter-Terrorism Cooperation" (International Process), which is being co-sponsored by Slovakia, Costa Rica, Japan, Switzerland, and Turkey, with the support of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation.
2. The aim of the second workshop was to allow the participants an opportunity to focus sustained attention on one of the core topics addressed in the first workshop: UN engagement with regional, sub-regional and functional bodies and civil society on implementing the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Although not intended to reach any definitive conclusions, the two-day event allowed some 60 experts representing states, multilateral bodies, and civil society from around the world to engage in a frank discussion of the role that these stakeholders can play in furthering the implementation of the UN Strategy and what steps the UN, in particular its Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Task Force), might take to stimulate this engagement.
3. The workshop was conducted under the Chatham House Rule, *i.e.*, all of the discussion was off the record and not for attribution. The following summary of the highlights and themes identified during the meeting is not an official or complete record of the proceedings and does not necessarily reflect the views of all the participants.
4. There was broad agreement that functional, regional, and sub-regional bodies, civil society and other stakeholders have essential roles to play in furthering the implementation of the UN Strategy, but that their potential in this area has yet to be realized. It was emphasized that global counter-terrorism efforts can only be effective if all relevant stakeholders are involved and if the different needs and realities of each region are reflected in efforts to promote implementation of the UN Strategy. To this end, participants agreed that it is important to identify the comparative advantages of each relevant stakeholder and how it can play to its different strengths, as well as to deepen the engagement between the UN and regional and local actors in the context of Strategy implementation.
5. Participants discussed issues surrounding the work of the Task Force and its so far limited engagement with many of these stakeholders, which is largely due to the Task Force's resource and mandate limitations. The work of the Task Force should become more transparent, many agreed, including by finding ways to communicate more directly and regularly with member states and other stakeholders. In addition, these stakeholders should become more proactive and approach the Task Force and its representative entities directly.

6. Throughout the course of the workshop, a number of concrete proposals were offered aimed at deepening Task Force engagement. Some participants called for the Task Force to develop a comprehensive strategy for engagement with these stakeholders, which could incorporate some of these proposals. This could and should be done, many felt, if the Task Force is given additional staff and other resources, which – as many agreed – it merits.

7. Workshop participants were reminded not to lose sight of the progress the establishment of the Task Force represents, as it marks the first time that the UN has a mechanism in place that can help avoid duplication and promote a more coherent approach to counter-terrorism within the UN.

### **I. UN Engagement with Regional and Sub-Regional Bodies on the Implementation of the UN Strategy**

8. It was stressed that regional bodies are able to: 1) focus work on specific contextual issues most pressing to the region, rather on the broader, global agenda; 2) contribute to capacity building efforts in the region, including by identifying the needs and priorities of its members, helping to bring together states with a common set of interests and objectives, facilitating technical assistance delivery, and serving both as implementation partners of the actual providers of assistance and as the focal point for capacity building programs in the region so as to help minimize the likelihood of duplication of efforts; 3) lend political support for Strategy implementation efforts, including by adding calls in regional ministerial statements for states in the region to implement the Strategy. Such a high-level approach at the regional level may often resonate more than at the level of the UN; 4) help ensure that the regional priorities reinforce those reflected in the Strategy's global framework.

9. It was suggested that to take full advantage of these comparative advantages regional bodies should approach the Task Force and indicate what their needs and priorities are and to jointly identify which Task Force entities should be pulled in to engage the relevant countries on Strategy implementation issues. It was generally agreed that the specificities and needs of regions and sub-regions, and bodies within these regions and sub-regions, have to be taken into account in the implementation of the UN Strategy.

10. The point was made that many regional bodies have been involved in work that is related to Strategy implementation – in areas such as capacity building, adopting their own counter-terrorism conventions and action plans, and promoting respect for human rights – since well before the adoption of the Strategy. As a result, many have expertise and experiences to share with and that could benefit the Task Force and its working groups. The Task Force recognizes the important role that regional and sub-regional bodies can play in furthering Strategy implementation and has engaged with these stakeholders in a number of ways, including through the interactions of its different entities. There was a broad recognition that although more engagement is necessary, a lack of resources was making this difficult to achieve.

11. Each entity on the Task Force needs to do more to reach out to different regional bodies. Yet, it was stressed that it is mostly the responsibility of the member states in each relevant inter-governmental body to instruct its representatives to push for a more coordinated and integrated vertical and horizontal approach to Strategy implementation issues.

12. As the Task Force secretariat seeks to deepen its engagement with regional and sub-regional bodies, careful attention needs to be paid to rationalize this outreach with the ongoing efforts of

the most active UN counter-terrorism actors such as UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) and its Executive Directorate (CTED).

13. Some cautioned against having the Task Force become the single day-to-day focal point for UN engagement with regional and sub-regional stakeholders on Strategy issues, as individual Task Force entities should continue to carry on with their operational activities in this area. However, it was suggested that the Task Force could establish the strategic framework for this engagement and use its convening authority to bring regional and sub-regional bodies together to share best practices and assess implementation within each region/sub-region. This could be done, for example, after the September 2008 review if the Task Force is provided with the necessary resources and mandate.

14. The point was made that the Task Force could be provided additional resources while still abiding by the “within existing resources” language of the UN Strategy. This could be accomplished through a reallocation of existing resources to the Task Force, which, it was asserted, would require making counterterrorism more of a priority within the UN. A recommendation was made for a group of UN ambassadors in New York from different regions to approach the Secretary-General and ask him to reallocate a few positions within his office to help service the Task Force.

15. A number of concrete proposals were offered aimed at allowing the Task Force to engage more directly and regularly with regional and sub-regional bodies and otherwise increase the flow of information from the Task Force to these and other stakeholders. These included: 1) establishing a point of contact within each Task Force working group to reach out to regional and sub-regional bodies; 2) providing these stakeholders regular updates on the Task Force and working group meetings, including by placing more information on the Task Force website; 3) establishing a mechanism to allow for the sharing of information between the Task Force, states, regional and sub-regional bodies, and civil society; 4) having the Task Force prepare and disseminate a regular newsletter, modeled on the ones produced by the OAS and OSCE’s counter-terrorism organs, which could include information about the various Task Force working groups and other pertinent Strategy-related updates; 5) establishing a mechanism at the regional level where the UN meets with the relevant regional body and member states to develop a Strategy implementation plan and each year have a follow-up meeting on what has been done and what more is needed. It was suggested that the existing UNODC mechanism where it discusses criminal justice issues with regional bodies and governments could be used for this purpose; 6) allowing for more interaction between the UN and different regions, the Task Force working group structure could be revisited to focus more attention on regions rather than exclusively on thematic issues; 7) having each Task Force working group chair brief states, organizations and other stakeholders on the work of the relevant working group well in advance of September’s formal Strategy review; 8) convening annual or semi-annual Task Force meetings involving broad range of state, intergovernmental, and civil society stakeholders; and 9) some called for regional bodies to become more involved in the work of the Task Force and its working groups, including possibly by having regular consultations to inform other stakeholders of their work and/or making some regional bodies full members of the Task Force. Others, however, cautioned against expanding the Task Force’s membership, preferring instead to consolidate the existing structure for fear of making it too unwieldy and going beyond its original purpose, which was to enhance coordination within the UN.

16. In general, it was highlighted that the Task Force would require a full-time staff person, and other resources, to undertake the sort of sustained engagement with regional and sub-regional bodies (and other stakeholders) that many of the participants seemed to be calling for. Such

resources, it was noted, were unlikely to materialize in the near term. Participants were thus cautioned against placing too many expectations on the Task Force.

17. One way to improve Task Force outreach without overstressing its limited resources is to encourage it to leverage existing networks established by regional bodies such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) Action against Terrorism Unit (ATU) and the Organization of American States' (OAS) Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE). This could be done on a limited basis at first and then built up over time if more resources were forthcoming.

18. It was also suggested that member states should consider becoming more proactive in reaching out to the Task Force. For example, they might organize themselves around a thematic issue of common interest and seek to engage with the relevant Task Force working group. In this regard, particular emphasis could be placed on developing a cross-regional coalition of states on certain issues.

19. Attention also focused on what regional and sub-regional bodies could do to stimulate engagement with the Task Force and promote Strategy implementation more broadly, as the needs and perspectives of these bodies need to be taken into account in its implementation.

20. Thus, for example, it was suggested that they could identify areas of common interest in the region; develop regional standards and best practices; evaluate implementation of their members through peer evaluations or mutual assessment; and translate the Strategy into the local languages and disseminate it within region. In addition, regional bodies could identify the needs and priorities for its members and approach the Task Force to present this information with a view to identifying which Task Force entities should join together to work to help address these needs.

21. It was further recommended that regional Strategy implementation task forces be established, with the relevant regional body serving as the focal point for the task force's engagement with the UN system.

22. In addition, it was suggested that the Task Force create a wider range of working groups, including one on conflict resolution, to establish a more balanced approach to implementation and begin to develop concrete, non-binding recommendations, in a number of working group activities to promote counter-terrorism "solutions." These recommendations could be modeled on those issued by the FATF.

23. Throughout the workshop it was emphasized that the Task Force has an open door policy to meet with member states and encourages states to take full advantage of this opportunity. In addition, the Task Force continues to urge states to join together across regions to seek to engage with the Task Force or its working groups.

24. While more states need to avail themselves of these informal opportunities to interact with the Task Force, the view was expressed that a more formal way for states to engage with the Task Force might be needed to help ensure that member state ownership over the Strategy is sustained.

## **II. Engaging with Functional Organizations on the Implementation of the UN Strategy**

25. The participants identified some of the ways in which functional bodies can contribute to implementation of the Strategy. For example, they are well-placed to develop and disseminate best practices (some referred to them as “preferred practices”) and encourage adoption of global standards in areas relevant to the Strategy.

26. Some functional bodies within the UN family are represented on the Task Force, e.g., the World Bank, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the World Customs Organization. Informal bodies and mechanisms with limited membership and no affiliation with the UN, such as the Egmont Group, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), and various export control regimes, however, are not, although they work on issues that are directly relevant to effective implementation of the UN Strategy.

27. There was broad agreement on the need to ensure effective engagement with functional bodies on issues related to the Strategy, including with those bodies not represented on the Task Force. Participants emphasized, however, that this engagement should not come at the expense of the core work of these bodies.

28. Further, some urged caution with respect to the extent to which the Task Force should try to coordinate the work of these bodies. Many functional bodies are already performing their own respective jobs well, within their existing, often treaty-based, mandates that pre-date the Strategy, without being “coordinated” or “micromanaged” by the Task Force. Nevertheless, it was argued that there still should be a mechanism in place to allow for closer cooperation by providing Strategy-relevant information to these bodies on a timely basis.

29. It was also noted that without necessarily using the “counter-terrorism” label, functional organizations, such as the OPCW, are able to encourage and push members to fulfill obligations, which are understood to contribute to the implementation of discrete parts of the Strategy and, more broadly, to the fight against terrorism. This model could be applied for persuading stakeholders – which may be wary of being viewed as “counter-terrorism” actors, per se – to engage more deeply in Strategy implementation activities and with the Task Force.

30. Some raised the possibility of having the Task Force engage with or even take on board as new members informal functional bodies or mechanisms, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, FATF, or the Egmont Group. Concerns were voiced about the lack of universal membership of many of these entities and the fact that including these non-UN bodies on the Task Force would be inconsistent with its current mandate.

31. Nevertheless, it was noted that there remains a need for more effective outreach with functional bodies outside of the Task Force. Experts within these functional bodies generally lack sufficient information concerning how the Task Force works and how their body might be able to contribute to the implementation of the Strategy. As mentioned throughout the workshop, more “arenas” and “mechanisms” to allow not just non-UN functional bodies, but states and other stakeholders to interact with the Task Force should be considered.

## **III. Engaging with Civil Society on Implementing the UN Strategy**

32. While acknowledging the different approaches to defining civil society that exist, the

participants recognized the important role that these groups can play in furthering implementation of the holistic UN Strategy and that civil society needs to be part of any comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy for it to be effective.

33. A number of reasons were given as to why it is so important to involve these groups more, including that: 1) conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism can only be addressed by engaging with all levels of society; 2) effective engagement with these groups can help soften the antagonism between the state and the public that can exist in the context of specific counter-terrorism actions and more generally; and 3) many potential solutions for the challenges of countering terrorism (*e.g.*, the financing of terrorism, terrorist misuse of the Internet, incitement to terrorism) will be enhanced by bottom-up approaches, rather than top-down strategies undertaken alone.

34. Participants highlighted some of the wide-ranging roles that civil society and non-government organizations (NGOs) can play and are playing in areas related to the Strategy, much of it being ongoing work that predates its adoption and is not labeled as “counter-terrorism” as such. Many of these roles are identified in the background paper prepared for the workshop and available at [http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/discussion/bratislava\\_process\\_paper.pdf](http://www.globalct.org/images/content/pdf/discussion/bratislava_process_paper.pdf).

For example, 1) they can develop a solid understanding of the threats and vulnerabilities in and gaps and priorities for their region. This information and knowledge could then help both to inform international efforts and increase ownership at the regional level for these efforts; 2) civil society groups and NGOs can help raise awareness about the importance of a holistic approach to combating terrorism and the need to address both “hard” and “soft” issues in a balanced manner. This can help to show that local concerns are being addressed and enhance legitimacy of counter-terrorism efforts at the national, regional, and sub-regional levels; 3) NGOs with the relevant expertise, can support UN capacity building efforts, where the UN is not able (for resource or political reasons) to deliver and can help ensure that these efforts receive the necessary follow-up attention and are sustainable; 4) civil society can promote discussion of issues that cannot be addressed properly at the UN, but which are crucial to the Strategy, for example, those related to alienation, marginalization, and radicalization. In this vein, grass roots organizations have an essential role to play in stimulating and participating in discussions surrounding inter and intra-cultural and religious dialogues; and 5) civil society groups can and do play an important role in highlighting the plight of the victims of terrorism.

35. Participants noted that States need to play an important role in stimulating the engagement of civil society and NGOs. Steps might include: 1) engaging with different ethnic and religious groups on security issues at the national level to stimulate cross-cultural and religious debate and dialogue; 2) ensuring that the views of civil society and NGOs are taken into account in the development of counter-terrorism legislation; and 3) providing civil society groups and NGOs an opportunity to engage directly with legislators regarding the potential impact of planned or actual impact of existing counter-terrorism measures

36. The discussion identified some steps that could be taken to enhance the ability of civil society groups to contribute to Strategy implementation, including by making the relevant work of the UN more transparent and creating local civil society networks and/or focal points on Strategy implementation. There was some debate, however, over whether this was the best approach in regions where there may be network fatigue, in which case efforts could be made to find the appropriate existing network in which to bring the Strategy.

37. At the national level it was suggested that counter-terrorism coordinators include civil society groups in their outreach activities. The challenge many states may face as they seek to generate

commitment from civil society on these issues is to avoid instrumentalizing these groups. Careful attention should thus be paid to explaining how engaging on counter-terrorism issues benefits both the state and civil society group concerned. In the context of the UN Strategy, more thought needs to be given as to how the Task Force can more clearly articulate the ways in which civil society and NGOs can help and how these actors stand to benefit from such involvement.

38. While there has generally been limited engagement between the Security Council's counter-terrorism bodies and its expert groups and civil society, some of the ways in which the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights involves and engages with civil society groups in its work in different areas related to the Strategy received attention.

39. The discussion also addressed the challenges faced in trying to get civil society groups to become more engaged in helping to promote and implement the UN Strategy. For example, the lack of a common definition of terrorism leaves civil society groups without a common understanding of the problem. Second, the lack of transparency and information sharing by the UN leaves civil society unsure of what they are signing up to support and without a sense of how it is in their interest to do so. Third, the continuing problem of serious human rights violations being perpetrated by some states in the name of counter-terrorism, contaminating the larger effort and making some groups reluctant to align themselves with the UN effort. Fourth, civil society does not speak with one voice, but rather reflects a range of concerns and interests, which makes targeting civil society in a framework as broad as the Strategy a particular challenge. Related to this, it was noted that most groups are not working under a "counter-terrorism" label and may see little benefit to being connected with such a label. Thus, more work is needed to articulate what is meant by "counter-terrorism" and how the Strategy provides an international framework to push existing advocacy work, e.g., on human rights etc.

40. It was recognized that the Task Force and its relevant entities may need to do more to raise awareness of the Strategy among and develop a channel for engagement with civil society groups. The point was also made, however, that given the diversity of interests, perspectives, and even definitions of "civil society," and the challenges this presents the UN, it was also important for interested civil society groups to reach out to the UN on these issues.

41. As the Task Force seeks to engage more with civil society and NGOs, it should seek to ensure that it learns from, builds upon, and does not duplicate the work that a number of regional bodies have undertaken (or are currently undertaking) to engage these stakeholders in the context of the fight against terrorism.

#### **IV. Engagement between UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism-Related Bodies and Regional, Sub-Regional, and Functional Bodies and Civil Society**

42. Regional bodies have important roles to play in helping states implement their Security Council counter-terrorism-related obligations and in helping the Council bodies carry out their work. For example, they provide valuable input on CTED site visits and offer specific technical or region-specific perspectives that help the Council committees and their experts to tailor their interaction with states by including local contextual issues that are otherwise likely to be overlooked with the originally adopted "one size fits all" approach. They can also contribute in areas such as monitoring implementation, assessing capacity gaps, encouraging implementation, standard setting, offering or sharing best practices, providing expertise, and maintaining interest in the region or sub-region. As a result of the Council's outreach to these bodies, a much wider range of actors are now involved in the global campaign against terrorism than ever before.

43. Pointing to the example of the committee established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1540, it was noted that its mandate requires it to engage with regional and functional organizations to pursue common objectives and share lessons learned. The committee has focused on raising awareness, including through regional meetings organized by the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, often in close cooperation with a regional organization. Recognizing the differing perceptions of security threats from region to region, the committee's group of experts has been careful to frame the requirements of the resolution in the context of the region's particular security interests. For example, in the Caribbean region it has highlighted how strengthened border and export controls (required under the resolution) will also enhance the ability to address the more pressing threats posed by small arms and light weapons and drug trafficking.

44. Much like the 1540 Committee group of experts, the CTED recognizes that effective engagement with regional and sub-regional, as well as functional bodies, and civil society, is one of the keys to ensuring its long-term success. The February 2008 CTED revised organizational plan prepared by its new Executive Director enumerates a number of steps that the CTED will be taking to engage with these stakeholders more proactively and regularly outside of New York. For example, it includes a more sophisticated outreach strategy than previously adopted by the expert group that consists of a broader array of options for how to conduct visits and seeks to understand better the realities on the ground. To this end, the expert group will be seeking to place its work in more of a regional context and adopt a more tailored approach to its interactions with countries and regional bodies, including by conducting shorter, more targeted visits to the field and to a wider group of actors. In addition, the CTED will be visiting not only countries in need of assistance, but also those which are either currently assistance providers or might otherwise have expertise and best practices to share with countries in their region, as part of an effort to enhance CTED's ability to deliver on its mandate to facilitate the delivery of technical assistance.

45. It was noted that this new CTED organizational plan is intended to address some limitations and the challenges that it and its parent body, the CTC, have faced since the CTED was established in 2004. Some of these were identified during the workshop. These include: 1) the need for CTC/CTED to pay more attention to trying to capture the regional context in its reports; 2) the fact that counter-terrorism is not viewed as a top priority in all regions and the sense in many countries that the Council bodies may be pushing an "outsider's agenda" agenda. To alleviate such suspicion, it was suggested that more transparency and consultation with non-Council members are needed. 3) the general lack of transparency in the work of the CTC/CTED, which, although the CTED has improved its website and posted some of its documents online, it was pointed out, has led to lagging cooperation with the G8's Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) as a result of the CTC/CTED's difficulty in sharing its analyses and other information with CTAG countries; 4) the CTC/CTED's traditional one-size fits all approach to dealing with states, which had not been tailored to allow for a better appreciation of the local and regional context in which it is operating. 5) the sense, particularly in developing regions, that filling out reports or participating in site visits are reaching a point of saturation and thus having diminishing returns. Many states do not even have the capacity to assess their own needs, let alone devote resources to demands from others; 6) the false distinction between "donor" and "recipient" states and regional bodies that some participants felt the CTC/CTED has drawn is unhelpful, by tending to add another layer of exclusivity; and 7) the fact that some states in the Global South may resent having a political body from New York determine what their capacity needs are, viewing this as a sovereign decision.

46. While it is too early to come to any conclusion about whether the new CTC/CTED approach will improve its ability to assess the needs and help determine on-the-ground priorities, it was noted that the CTC/CTED is committed to strengthening its cooperation and on-the-ground engagement with states and other stakeholders, with a view to establishing more productive dialogues with them.

47. Participants offered a number of suggestions to enhance the effectiveness of the CTC/CTED and the wider Council's counter-terrorism program including by having the three different relevant Council bodies and their respective expert groups engage with regional bodies and their members in a single channel on technical assistance issues, expanding activity that is currently limited to providing assistance with submitting reports to the Council. In addition, it was suggested that more outreach is needed not only to build wider support for the Security Council's efforts, but for the other relevant initiatives such as the G-8, given its limited membership. To address the latter point, it was suggested that the G8 find ways to make the work of its Roma-Lyon expert group and/or CTAG more transparent and place more emphasis on outreach to help enhance the awareness of this work. To this end, it was suggested that both groups invite non-members, including representatives from regional bodies and civil society to participate in a special session at the conclusion of the regular Roma-Lyon/CTAG meeting. This practice could begin during the 2009 G8.

48. Participants welcomed the suggestions aimed at making the work of the CTC/CTED (and G8) more inclusive and transparent and appreciated the CTC/CTED's efforts to do so moving forward. In particular, they welcomed the revised CTC/CTED organizational plan and expressed hope that it would make the CTC/CTED more effective and broaden the support for its work. It was questioned whether the new approach memorialized in the CTC/CTED's new organizational plan will allow the CTC/CTED to overcome the political obstacles it faces as a Council body operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and the resentment this continues to breed in some parts of the world. More generally it was suggested that the Security Council cannot continue to monopolize the UN process for engaging with states and regional bodies on counter-terrorism. Some asserted that the review of the Strategy in September offers an opportunity to chart a new approach.

49. Pointing to the example of the 1540 it was noted that its mandate requires it to engage with regional and functional organizations to pursue common objectives and share lessons learned. In keeping with its mandate the committee has focused on raising awareness and is now turning to capacity building in conjunction with such organizations.

50. Discussions touched briefly on Council engagement with civil society and NGOs on counter-terrorism-related issues. It was acknowledged that the Council has not traditionally sought to engage with civil society on these issues, although the outreach of the 1540 Committee to a small group of NGOs is a significant exception. It was pointed out that civil society and NGOs have an essential role to play in building consensus and understanding, though methods such as sharing information and convening stakeholders. Their role in providing recommendations and streamlining other areas of Council activities, such as implementing targeted sanctions is a case in point, such as implementing targeted sanctions is a case in point.

## **Next Steps**

51. At the end of the workshop it was announced that the Government of Turkey will be hosting the next workshop in the International Process on 22-23 May 2008 in Antalya. The topic of the workshop will be “The Role of the UN in Promoting and Strengthening the Rule of Law and Good Governance in the Context of the Implementation of the UN Strategy.” Following the Antalya workshop, the Japan Institute on International Affairs, with support from the Government of Japan, will host the fourth workshop in the International Process on 17-18 June 2008. The focus will be on the capacity building and technical assistance in the Asia-Pacific region. In early July 2008 there will be a wrap-up meeting in New York. More details regarding these events will follow once they become available. The process will result in the preparation of a final report and recommendations prior to the General Assembly’s first formal review of Strategy implementation efforts, which is scheduled for September 2008.