

## **IMPLEMENTING THE UN GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY IN THE AMERICAS\***

### **I. The UN General Assembly's Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy**

The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UN Strategy), which was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly on 8 September 2006 includes a broad range of measures aimed at addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; preventing and combating terrorism; building States' counterterrorism capacities, strengthening the role of the UN system in the provision and facilitation of capacity building assistance; and ensuring respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against terrorism. The Strategy identifies national governments as having primary responsibility for its implementation, while highlighting the supporting role that different parts of the UN system, regional and sub-regional bodies, and civil society should play in ensuring its effective implementation. By enumerating a holistic approach to addressing the terrorist threat, the Strategy represents a convergence of the global North's post-11 September counterterrorism priorities with the development and socio-economic agenda of the global South.

After September 2001, the UN system, in particular the Security Council, concentrated its efforts on getting states to implement law enforcement and other security-related measures to prevent and combat terrorism. Signaling a shift to a broader response to the threat, the UN Strategy promotes a comprehensive and coordinated approach at the national, regional, and international levels to counter terrorism and to deal with those conditions, which it deems conducive to the spread of terrorism, including prolonged unresolved conflicts; dehumanization of victims of terrorism; lack of rule of law and violations of human rights; ethnic, national, and religious discrimination; political exclusion; socio-economic marginalization; and lack of good governance. In doing so the Strategy reinforces the notion that development and respect for human rights and the rule of law are essential elements of a comprehensive approach to counterterrorism.

This paper presents a preliminary overview of issues relevant to the implementation of the UN Strategy in the Americas, paying particular attention to the Latin America and Caribbean Region (LACR).<sup>1</sup> It outlines some of the different security-related threats in the region, including those related to international and domestic terrorism and discusses the region's preparedness to address these real and perceived vulnerabilities. It further highlights the role that different parts of the UN system, the Organization of American States (OAS), and sub-regional bodies and frameworks such as the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF),<sup>2</sup> South American Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD),<sup>3</sup> Caribbean Community (CARICOM),<sup>4</sup> MERCOSUR,<sup>5</sup> the Central American Integration System (SICA),<sup>6</sup> and the 3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security,<sup>7</sup> as well as some of the region's largest bilateral donors such as the United States and Canada can play in furthering Strategy implementation in the region.

### **II. The Americas: Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Capacity Gaps**

Although several countries have been struggling with domestic terrorism for many years and there were instances of international terrorism in the Americas prior to 11 September 2001,<sup>8</sup> most

LACR countries have historically treated transnational criminal activities – drug trafficking, illicit trade in small arms, smuggling of contraband and money laundering, and other crime-related issues – with far greater urgency than they did the growing terrorism phenomenon. Internal armed conflict in Colombia, which is the only country in the region to link itself to the US “War on Terror,”<sup>9</sup> and other existing or latent conflicts in countries including Bolivia, Mexico (Chiapas), Ecuador, Haiti, Peru, and Venezuela, have also been sources of instability.<sup>10</sup> However, as Professor Arlene B. Tickner from the Universidad de los Andes and the Universidad Nacional de Columbia points out: “[t]here is no credible evidence that Latin America and the Caribbean is a base for international terrorist organizations or state-sponsored terrorist activities.”<sup>11</sup>

In general, the 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States did alert more officials and analysts about the possible impact of international terrorism on the LACR and instilled a greater sense of urgency in dealing with it. For most countries in the LACR, the reaction to those attacks was not so much because they considered themselves possible targets of, or directly threatened by terrorism, but was in part in solidarity with the United States and because of the economic fallout, which was immediate for a number of these countries. Commerce and tourism were severely affected throughout the region in the immediate post-9/11 period.<sup>12</sup> In addition, many countries in the region lost nationals in the attack on the World Trade Center.<sup>13</sup> Greater awareness of the vulnerability of the global supply chain and the potential impact of a terrorist attack brought further attention to the weakness of countries in the region that are heavily dependent on trade for their economic survival. The result has been that countries of the region are now required to implement new security requirements on travel and trade imposed by developed countries of the global North and new security standards developed by international specialized agencies since 2001, with many struggling to meet these new requirements.<sup>14</sup> US and international concerns are based on a host of real and perceived threats and challenges in the LACR, including in vulnerable areas, the influence and policies of outspoken populist leaders who may tolerate or support terrorist or transnational criminal organizations, corruption, weak state institutions, poverty, and threats associated with drug, arms, and human trafficking, and money laundering. Many of these real and perceived threats are compounded by the need for enhanced law enforcement capacity and border controls.

### ***Vulnerable Areas***

Although there may not be operational cells of Islamist terrorists in the hemisphere and the LACR has yet to be victimized by an international terrorist attack since 2001, there are pockets of ideological supporters and facilitators in South America and the Caribbean which may lend financial, logistical, and moral support to terrorist groups in the Middle East, and which should be cause for concern.<sup>15</sup> This issue is particularly complicated because some groups, designated as terrorist organizations by some countries in the region but not by others, may receive funding for social projects as well as for terrorist objectives. There are areas with high levels of illicit trade in drugs, weapons, and other materials, which may provide resources to terrorists. One such area in Latin America is sometimes referred to as the “Tri-Border Area” (TBA) or “Triple Frontier” bounded by Puerto Iguazu in Argentina; Ciudad del Este in Paraguay; and Foz do Iguacu in Brazil. As a center of drug smuggling activity and money laundering, the area has been a source of revenue for criminals and there is concern that it may also be a source of support for terrorist groups.<sup>16</sup> For example, the Argentinean government launched an investigation into alleged links between suspects from the area and the bombing of the Israeli Embassy and a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in the early 1990s. Egyptian authorities claim that two men arrested in the “Triple Frontier” were involved in a terrorist attack on tourists in Luxor in 1997.<sup>17</sup> More recently, US officials have expressed concern that Hezbollah and Hamas were raising funds in the TBA by participating in illicit activities and soliciting donations from extremists within the sizable

Muslim communities in the region and elsewhere in the territories of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.<sup>18</sup> This charge has repeatedly been rebutted by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, including in a December 2006 joint declaration.<sup>19</sup> In response the United States has acknowledged that while these groups are raising funds in the region, there was no corroborated information that these or other Islamic extremist groups had an operational presence in the area.<sup>20</sup>

Further north, hundreds of miles of land within the Darien Gap between Colombia and Panama and also in parts of western Venezuela and northwestern Brazil allegedly serve as staging grounds for insurgent and paramilitary groups that facilitate and receive revenue from the production and trade of narcotics. Some groups operating in that region have also been connected to weapons smuggling in Suriname, which along with Guyana and French Guyana, is host to another region where document fraud linked to Hezbollah activists has been reported.<sup>21</sup>

The Venezuelan free trade zone on Margarita Island has also been cited by US officials as a host to fundraising activity by Hezbollah members.<sup>22</sup> As Chris Zambelis, writing for the Jamestown Foundation's *Terrorism Monitor* points out, however, "the alleged threat emanating from Margarita Island is receiving far more attention in Washington, but is as much a product of the simmering tensions between the Bush Administration and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez."<sup>23</sup>

### ***The Chavez "Revolution"***

In the context of preventing the spread of terrorism in the region, President Chavez's toleration of activity by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in his country is troubling. Also, his developing relationship with Iran, which the US labels as a "state sponsor of terrorism," may increase tensions within the sub-region. In addition, Chavez has derived political clout from Venezuela's oil wealth, which is allegedly being used to buy weapons and to provide support for populist governments in the region. These leaders also have deteriorating relationships with the United States, which is impeding Washington's ability to garner support for counterterrorism activities in the region.<sup>24</sup> Chavez's reaction to Colombia's recent crossing into Ecuador to kill a FARC rebel leader which included the closing of Venezuela's Bogota Embassy and sending thousands of troops to the countries' border showed the risks of a situation that may get out of control in unfortunate circumstances.<sup>25</sup> The OAS negotiations to resolve this crisis also revealed the tensions between hemispheric commitments to condemn and prosecute terrorists and issues of sovereignty.

With respect to the United States, Chavez continues to complain of the double standard that he sees in Washington's position on terrorism, exemplified by its continued refusal to extradite Luis Posada Carriles, who Venezuela and Cuba accuse of planning the 1976 bombing of a Cuban passenger jet that killed 76 people.<sup>26</sup> Since 2005, both Cuba and Venezuela have repeatedly raised this issue in Security Council open meetings to discuss the work of the Council's counterterrorism machinery as well as in the General Assembly and within the OAS.

### ***Narcotics Production and Trafficking***

The illicit production and sale of drugs in certain parts of Latin America is a severe and destabilizing threat in the region and beyond, as it provides revenue for criminal elements, involves the same illicit networks used by terrorists, and more generally contributes to the degradation of government control and the rule of law.<sup>27</sup> According to the US Department of State, "terrorism in the Western Hemisphere [is] primarily perpetrated by narco-terrorist organizations based in Colombia and by the remnants of radical leftist Andean groups."<sup>28</sup> For

example, rebel groups in Colombia, most notably the FARC and the National Liberation Army, control large swaths of territory and have been estimated to generate hundreds of millions of dollars of revenue per year.<sup>29</sup> These groups along with insurgence groups in other parts of the region including the Shining Path in Peru are on the US Department of State's list of foreign terrorist organizations and US officials often express concern over alleged links between these groups and terrorist organizations located outside the region, such as Hezbollah.

Efforts by the United States to address the problem of drug trafficking in the region, notably in the 1980s, and the ongoing "Plan Colombia,"<sup>30</sup> which have involved training and funding national militaries and widespread crop eradication efforts, have also helped to stoke pockets of anti-US sentiment in Latin America.<sup>31</sup> Accordingly, foreign-led efforts to link the threat of transnational terrorism with the region's illicit drug problems have often been resisted by countries in the region.<sup>32</sup> This in turn has complicated US efforts to deepen its counterterrorism cooperation with some countries in the region.

### ***Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing***

Money laundering associated with the drug trade has been a longstanding issue in the LACR. A combination of factors including porous borders, corruption, and lack of resources have hampered efforts to detect and prosecute these activities in many parts of the hemisphere, where additional concerns were raised after 9/11 due to lax regulation in many offshore jurisdictions. While only a small percentage of suspicious activity reports by financial institutions to financial regulatory authorities demonstrate a link between instances of money laundering and terrorism, the amount of money transferred in connection with other dangerous illicit activity in the region presents a major concern to North American authorities. As is mentioned in more detail below, working with bilateral donors (principally the United States and Canada) and multilateral partners – such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, GAFISUD (the FATF-style body for South America), the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the Organization of American States' Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (OAS/CICAD) and Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and the United Nations – many countries in the region have made important strides in building their capacity to address the problem of money laundering/terrorist financing in recent years. However, as a result of the sheer volume of transactions linked to illicit crime in the region and its proximity to the United States, the US Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence continues to see money laundering and its link to terrorist financing in Latin America and the Caribbean as "very real threats."<sup>33</sup> Nevertheless, many countries in the region continue to dispute the connection.

In general, countries in the LACR have been reluctant to allow what are perceived as Northern security-related concerns, and particularly the US-led "Global War on Terror" (and by extension the US-dominated Security Council counterterrorism agenda), to take priority over other issues that have been at top of national and regional agendas for decades in Latin America, such as sustainable development.<sup>34</sup>

### ***The Strategy's Potential in the Americas***

The Strategy offers an opportunity for the UN system to reshape its counterterrorism engagement with the region. Doing so will allow the UN to place counterterrorism concerns in the context of issues that are more salient to the region including development, poverty reduction, and efforts to combat corruption, drug trafficking, and other criminal activities. Security threats presented by criminal activities continue to receive priority treatment from many states in the LACR, where

the impact of these transnational criminal activities appears to pose a far greater threat to security and development than does the threat of international terrorism. However, the links between these vulnerabilities and development have made it an imperative for states in the region to seek to strengthen their capacities to deal with money laundering, improve their customs and border control, and airport and seaport security.

The OAS General Assembly has recognized the importance of adopting a “multidimensional approach to hemispheric security,” noting that “security threats, concerns and other challenges in the hemispheric context are of diverse nature and multidimensional scope, and that the traditional concept and approach must be expanded to encompass new and non-traditional threats, which include political, economic, social, health, and environmental aspects”<sup>35</sup> The UN Strategy, by taking into consideration, security, development, good governance, and human rights components, reflects this same approach, which should enhance its relevance to the region, by contributing to addressing the region’s development deficiencies and other pressing issues such as crime and violence and related socio-economic issues.

### **III. The Role of the UN System**

Coordinated, strategic, and sustained engagement by the different parts of the UN system will be needed to help countries in the region to seize upon the opportunity presented by the UN Strategy to develop a more balanced and effective approach to addressing the threat of terrorism. These different parts of the UN system include both the traditional counterterrorism bodies such as the various Security Council bodies and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB), as well as entities not traditionally associated with counterterrorism such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the World Customs Organization (WCO).<sup>36</sup> Many of these actors, though not all, are represented on the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Task Force). By bringing together traditional counterterrorism actors with development and human rights bodies operating in the region, the Task Force offers a framework to allow the UN system to pursue the holistic approach contemplated in the UN Strategy.

In order to be an effective medium for advancing implementation of the UN Strategy in the LACR, the nascent Task Force needs to become an effective clearinghouse for the programs of its twenty-four participating bodies. This will allow for sharing of best practices and experiences gained from working within the region. The Task Force “secretariat” must be able to gather information on the relevant programs (current and planned) of each UN body, and analyze and disseminate the data to all Task Force participants to inform them of possible opportunities for cooperation and collaboration, as well as allowing them the opportunity to target in a timely manner scarce resources to areas of need and avoid duplication of efforts. The Task Force should also seek to engage donor states operating in LACR to leverage their contributions in the process.

#### ***UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate***

The CTC, with the support of its expert group, the CTED, is charged with monitoring the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373, which imposed a range of security-related counterterrorism obligations on all UN member states. Among other things, the CTC/CTED is responsible for facilitating the delivery of counterterrorism technical assistance to states that it

has identified as needing help implementing the provisions of the resolution, as well as engaging with and coordinating the counterterrorism activities of international, regional, and sub-regional bodies. Despite the significant capacity gaps in the region, to date the CTC/CTED's impact in the Americas has been limited.

The CTC/CTED's limited engagement with the region is partially the result of some resistance from certain LACR countries on the Security Council (and the CTC), which did not view the region as a priority area for the CTC/CTED and therefore showed little inclination for a proactive CTC/CTED role in the region. This attitude may have arisen from the general perception in the region that the risk for international terrorism (as opposed to domestic terrorism) was low in LACR and that, as part of the Security Council, the CTC/CTED is pursuing a US agenda. As a result, the LACR is the only region that has yet to consent to receive a visit from the CTC/CTED pursuant to Resolution 1535. Without country visits, the CTC/CTED has had difficulty determining the extent to which states are implementing the requirements of Resolution 1373 on the ground. Unable to conduct a proper assessment of the region's deficiencies, the CTC/CTED is significantly impeded in its ability to carry out its monitoring and assistance facilitation mandate effectively in the region.

In addition, LACR countries have generally objected to CTED attempts to refer to issues that might be connected with terrorism such as drug trafficking, trafficking in small arms and lights weapons, and corruption, arguing that they fall outside the scope of Resolution 1373 and thus the CTC/CTED's mandate. This despite the fact that the resolution explicitly “[n]otes with concern the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money-laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials, and in this regard emphasizes the need to enhance coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in order to strengthen a global response to this serious challenge and threat to international security.”<sup>37</sup>

Given the political challenges the CTC/CTED has faced in connecting with countries in the LACR, it should come as little surprise that, apart from facilitating legislative drafting assistance by the UNODC's Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB), the CTC/CTED has so far not had much success in facilitating the delivery of technical assistance to states in the region. There appear to be only two instances – with Paraguay and Jamaica – where the CTC/CTED has been able to move beyond the exchange of letters and reviews of reports submitted by each state and work on the ground with an individual state.

The first was precipitated by a letter from Paraguay to the CTC Chairman indicating that it was unable to adopt the legislation necessary to comply with Resolution 1373. In response, the CTC/CTED has actively engaged with Paraguayan officials to try to help overcome the parliamentary objections to the revised penal law, which were based in large part on fears that the law would be used against the political opposition. CTED officials, including its Executive Director and other CTED experts, in close coordination with UNODC and OHCHR, met with members of parliament and civil society groups to explain the importance of adopting the law so as to comply with the country's international obligations and reassure them that the revised law conformed with international human rights norms, thus trying to mitigate concerns regarding potential abuse.

The second was an early 2008 CTED “fact-finding mission” (as opposed to an assessment visit) to Jamaica – which put into practice the Executive Director's new approach – where two CTED experts visited the capital for two and a half days to gather updated information

from the Jamaican authorities on efforts to implement Resolution 1373 and to explore the possibility of having Jamaica provide technical assistance to other Caribbean states. The CTED also took the opportunity to meet with embassy officials of a number of the key bilateral donors to learn more about what assistance is currently being provided to Jamaica and try to match donor interest and capabilities with identified needs. The CTED proposed this mission to respond to the frustration Jamaica expressed at being asked to prepare a sixth report to the CTC, given the government's limited resources and the fact that it had yet to receive anything tangible in return for submitting its first five submissions. These sorts of shorter, targeted visits, which require significantly fewer resources to undertake, and focus on information gathering and other issues related to allowing CTED to perform its technical assistance facilitation function more effectively – and not on assessing on the ground implementation efforts – are less likely to present the political problems that the assessment visits have.

In addition to its limited and often superficial interactions with states in the region, the CTC/CTED has struggled in its attempts to deepen its relationships with regional and sub-regional bodies in the LACR. Although CTED officials continue to meet and share information with the CICTE Secretariat, the CARICOM Secretariat, and the GAFISUD Executive Secretariat, it is not clear the extent to which either the CTC/CTED or these regional and sub-regional bodies have benefited from this engagement, which has generally been neither strategic in nature nor coordinated with the other relevant UN counterterrorism actors.

One obstacle to effective CTC/CTED engagement among the small island countries in the Americas has been the lack of a dedicated counterterrorism unit in the CARICOM Secretariat. Partly as a result, rather than choosing to work with the CTC/CTED, individual CARICOM countries have tended to leverage their traditional bilateral relationships to seek counterterrorism-related capacity building assistance from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom and from international specialized organizations and other partners. Programs of assistance that have emerged from these relationships are developed and pursued primarily on the basis of shared security-related interests with each respective partner. While most of these programs are provided directly on a bilateral basis, others have been provided through the OAS (CICTE and CICAD) and the CFATF, as well as the UNODC on its own and in cooperation with the OAS.

There are, however, some signs that the situation is starting to improve, including the appointment of an experienced new CTED Executive Director, who is both aware of the CTED's historic shortcomings and has put forward a strategy for addressing them. The revised organizational plan for the CTED, which the Executive Director drafted and the CTC endorsed in early February 2008 – an endorsement the Council “welcome[d] and affirm[ed]” in its March 2008 resolution renewing the CTED mandate until the end of 2010 – contemplates tailor-made country and regional visits taking in several countries at a time, each focusing on specific aspects of Resolution 1373 rather than the resolution as a whole.<sup>38</sup> Such visits should enable the CTC/CTED to overcome some of the political opposition it has heretofore faced from LACR members of the CTC and assist states in the region more effectively, particularly as the CTC/CTED moves away from relying on written country reports and seeks to engage more directly and informally with experts in capitals (as opposed to diplomats in New York). CTED has produced Preliminary Implementation Assessments (PIAs) for each country in the Americas, which provide a comprehensive overview of national efforts to implement Resolution 1373. These PIAs, which are in the process of being shared and discussed with the states concerned, are meant to serve as the basis of the CTC/CTED's intensified and tailored dialogue with individual states. The CTED has also put together a directory of best practices related to the different provisions of Resolution 1373; incorporated the needs of countries in the LACR into its Technical Assistance Matrix, which provides information on states' needs; and updated the

Directory of Assistance, which contains information on available technical assistance. In addition, CTED is also exploring bringing regional and sub-regional actors and donors together, which may help facilitate and improve the coordination of capacity-building assistance.

Further, recognizing the political sensitivities that continue to surround its work in much of the LACR, the CTED is becoming more proactive in identifying opportunities in which to work with regional and sub-regional bodies which have broader political support among their members. These efforts might allow the CTED to become more involved in the technical assistance and other capacity-building activities of those organizations, and allow for more engagement with national counterterrorism officials on the ground. The CTED still needs to identify ways in which it can engage at the political level with states in the region as part of an effort to prod them to move more rapidly to implement their obligations under Resolution 1373. To make progress in this area the CTED should consistently seek to place its work in the broader context of the UN Strategy, which all UN member states endorsed.

### ***1267 Committee and Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Monitoring Team***

The 1267 Committee, the Security Council committee responsible for maintaining and overseeing implementation of the financial sanctions, arms embargoes, and travel bans against the Taliban, al-Qaida, and associated individuals, is a critical means for internationalizing sanctions against individuals on its Consolidated List. With no one on the List from or operating out of the LACR, however, both the committee and the Monitoring Team, the group responsible for helping the committee monitor sanctions' implementation, have paid scant attention to the region. The Monitoring Team has had some interactions with countries in the Caribbean, in particular with Trinidad and Tobago, where a group – Abu Bakr Bashir – that may have had links to individuals or entities on the List, had a presence, although most members are either dead or have been arrested. The arrests on 2 June 2007 of several individuals from the region in an alleged plot to attack John F. Kennedy Airport in New York raised awareness of the potential of the threat emanating from the region and brought heightened scrutiny over the threat of terrorist cells developing across the Caribbean and the potential it offers as a base to launch attacks against the United States.<sup>39</sup> For the Monitoring Team, however, it did not meet the credibility threshold of having possible links to those on the List to warrant its attention.

A number of LACR countries have neither the legal or institutional framework in place to implement the mandated asset freezes nor the capacity to implement the travel ban and arms embargo. Further, nine LACR countries have failed to submit reports to the committee on implementation of the mandated sanctions.<sup>40</sup>

Recognizing the capacity limitations in the region, the Monitoring Team has played an instrumental role together with UNODC's TPB and the other Security Council counterterrorism-related expert groups, in designing an assistance program to assist a number of CARICOM countries with the preparation of the necessary reports to the different Security Council counterterrorism-related bodies. Canada provided the funds for a consultant who has begun to make the rounds to the relevant capitals.

### ***UN Office of Drugs and Crime***

The UNODC, through its TPB and Global Programme against Money Laundering, is the principal provider of counterterrorism technical assistance within the UN system. The role of the UNODC in the region is to provide technical assistance in the area of drug-trafficking, money-laundering, and counterterrorism capacity-building. In particular, the UNODC – in partnership

with CICTE – has been involved in assisting states in counterterrorism legislative drafting and helping them develop and maintain effective criminal justice systems.

With funding support from the governments of Canada, Italy, and Spain, the TPB – in partnership with CICTE and CICAD – has been engaged in specific areas of legal assistance and capacity building support, in cooperation with other UNODC entities and specialized organizations operating in the region (in particular the World Bank and IMF with regard to money-laundering and financing of terrorism). In fact, UNODC’s TPB partners with the CICTE Secretariat on almost every activity it undertakes in the region, with the latter providing significant funding and logistical support for the former’s activities.

The TPB and CICTE have engaged together extensively on the ground both at the national and regional levels with a view to, *inter alia*: 1) increasing awareness among policy makers and political leaders of the importance of joining and implementing the universal instruments against terrorism and complying with Security Council counterterrorism resolutions; 2) increasing expertise and capacity at the national level, particularly judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials, to implement these instruments and the relevant counterterrorism legislation; 3) enhancing the specialized counterterrorism skills of relevant criminal justice officials through targeted training; and 4) reinforcing and promoting the use of extradition and mutual legal assistance and other forms of international cooperation in criminal matters. In 2007 alone, the TPB convened twelve national legislative workshops to provide drafting assistance to relevant government authorities to enable them to ratify the universal instruments and draft the necessary legislation to implement them, as well as training of criminal justice officials on how to use these new tools. In addition, during this same year TPB conducted three specialized training workshops for criminal justice officials, as well as three other regional conferences and workshops aimed at mobilizing political support for implementing the relevant counterterrorism instruments and laws.<sup>41</sup> Perhaps most significantly in the context of building political support in the region for implementation of the UN Strategy, the TPB co-organized with CICTE a ministerial conference hosted by the Dominican Republic, which produced the Declaration of Santo Domingo whereby the participating Caribbean countries requested “UNODC, including its Terrorism Prevention Branch and its relevant regional offices, to strengthen and sustain the implementation of the UN Global Strategy against Terrorism.”<sup>42</sup>

The TPB has an ambitious program planned for 2008 in the region, which includes the development, in cooperation with Colombia, of a *Practitioner’s Manual of Terrorism Cases*, which “will focus on the most relevant counterterrorism judicial issues that have arisen through the course of investigating and prosecuting cases of real life terrorist acts...”<sup>43</sup> The intended target audience is judges and judicial and investigative police. As an example of a regional initiative complementary to UNODC’s global efforts, CICTE’s “Guide to the Prevention, Detention and Suppression of Terrorist Financing,” developed in conjunction with CICAD, also serves as a useful reference tool and UNODC participates in seminars on terrorist financing organized by the two OAS secretariat bodies.

While the UNODC has concentrated a great deal of its efforts in the region on advancing the legislative framework for the universal legal instruments against terrorism, the overall ratification and/or accession rates in LACR countries for the original twelve instruments are mixed. Most countries in South and Central America are parties to at least ten of these instruments (only three are not).<sup>44</sup> This contrasts with eight of fourteen CARICOM member states having ratified or acceded to fewer than ten.<sup>45</sup> Of particular concern is the fact that eighteen of the LACR countries have yet to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Financing.<sup>46</sup> In addition to the varying degrees of participation in these different

treaty regimes, many states that have become parties continue to lack the capacity and expertise to respond to the legislative and operational requirements of these conventions. In the meantime, however, 23 OAS member states are party to the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, which makes explicit reference to the universal instruments.<sup>47</sup>

The UNODC also has an important role in helping countries in the region to implement the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its three Protocols, which receive explicit mention in the UN Strategy. It provides technical assistance in legislative drafting to implement the criminal provisions, to adopt new frameworks for mutual legal assistance; and to facilitate extradition, law enforcement cooperation, and training.<sup>48</sup>

One should look carefully at some of the reasons for UNODC's success – particularly when compared with the CTC/CTED – in engaging with countries in the region on terrorism (and other security) issues as there may be lessons to be applied as the UN seeks to further Strategy implementation in the region. First, UNODC (unlike CTC/CTED) has a sustained presence in the region via its field offices in South America (in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico) and a network of regional consultants with the necessary specialized legal expertise to draw upon when convening workshops in the region. This regional presence not only gives UNODC a certain level of credibility in the region, but has placed it in a better position to develop and maintain partnerships with local stakeholders, including the OAS and sub-regional bodies, which are essential to ensuring local buy-in and that capacity building activities receive the necessary follow-up attention. Second, unlike the CTC/CTED, UNODC, in particular its TPB, offers states something concrete in return for their cooperation, namely, training and other forms of technical assistance.

### ***UN Development Programme***

UNDP, with programs in 166 countries and 135 offices around the world has a central role in helping states address a number of conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism identified in the UN Strategy, including through the promotion of good governance, the rule of law, and human rights compliance as part of an effort to support sustained economic and social development. In partnership with donor states, other UN agencies, and international partners, UNDP undertakes programs dealing with poverty reduction, democratic governance, rule of law, social and economic development strategies, HIV and AIDS, crisis prevention and recovery, environment, and conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.<sup>49</sup>

Although the UNDP has steered clear of associating with counterterrorism efforts in the past, it is the UN body best positioned, because of its worldwide outreach and in-country presence, to coordinate technical assistance across all disciplines to help states implement the UN Strategy. It could serve as a focal point in each country, thereby bringing synergy to UN efforts. As a member of the Task Force, UNDP is yet to define its role in a practical way, most likely due to the sensitivity with which most members of the UN view its role. UNDP should not be perceived to be diverting development resources to counterterrorism efforts, except, perhaps where it is accepted that there is a nexus between security (including counterterrorism-related security) and development. However, in helping to alleviate conditions in the region which are conducive to the spread of terrorism, UNDP has an indispensable role in the overall scheme of helping countries implement the UN Strategy.

Political challenges to getting UNDP headquarters in New York to associate itself more closely with the Strategy and counterterrorism efforts more broadly are indeed formidable. Pillar I of the Strategy, which focuses on addressing conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism,

explicitly links attaining the MDGs with Strategy implementation and should be emphasized more in most regions, including the Americas. There is a need for the UN Secretary-General and member states (including those from the Americas) to call on UNDP to become more engaged. Currently, these calls have been limited to European countries, which seem motivated by a desire for guidance on dealing with the nexus between security and development in their aid programs.

In the short term, efforts should be made to include counterterrorism within the mandate of the UN's rule of law and security coordination resource group, in which UNDP, but apparently no representative from a traditional UN counterterrorism body, is involved. It should be noted that UNDP is not the only part of the UN system with a role to play in Pillar I activities that needs to be encouraged to become involved in Strategy-implementation efforts. Others include the UN Children's Fund, the UN Development Fund for Women, and the UN Population Fund.

### ***UN Education, Science and Cultural Organization***

UNESCO with its program involvement in some 143 countries is another UN body with broad outreach with UN member states and the potential to assist in the implementation of the UN Strategy. In addition to its country programs, UNESCO maintains eleven field offices in the Americas which includes five clusters and three regional bureaus.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, the UN Strategy specifically identifies UNESCO as having a lead role in promoting ethnic, national, and religious tolerance and respect for all religions, religious values, beliefs, or cultures by establishing and encouraging education and public awareness programs. UNESCO recognized terrorism as an attack against humanity and has worked to create the conditions for dialogue among civilians and peoples based upon respect for commonly shared values.<sup>51</sup>

## **IV. The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Bodies**

Through the OAS, the Americas has perhaps the most developed and effective regional organization in the world outside of Europe. The OAS has played an important role throughout the region in promoting development, democracy, rule of law and human rights, building security capacity to deal with drug trafficking, illicit firearms trafficking, border control, and facilitating and providing counterterrorism capacity building assistance. Nevertheless, institutional fragmentation with the OAS system, financial limitations of its secretariat, and the fact that some regional actors see the organization as “an instrument of direct or indirect domination,”<sup>52</sup> have somewhat hindered its ability to implement its wide-ranging mandates effectively.

The work of the OAS is complemented by a number of sub-regional organizations including the CFATF, GAFISUD, CARICOM, MERCOSUR, and SICA. A number of these bodies have leveraged the support of the international community through multilateral and bilateral assistance to carry out a number of programs in the region that have helped to enhance the counterterrorism and other security-related capacities of states in the region. In addition, the IADB, through its loans and grants helps finance development projects and supports strategies to reduce poverty, expand growth, increase trade and investment, promote regional integration, and foster private sector development and modernization of the state, all of which are critical to furthering holistic implementation of the UN Strategy in the region. Each of these bodies has a role to play in furthering Strategy implementation in the region. The Task Force needs to become better acquainted with their activities and then seek to create synergies between these activities and those of the relevant UN actors in the region.

## *The Organization of American States*

### *The Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE)*

The OAS carries out its counterterrorism capacity-building work primarily through the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE),<sup>53</sup> created in 1999 and supported by its Secretariat. The CICTE Secretariat, along with the Executive Secretariat of CICAD and the new Department of Public Security, is now a part of the OAS Secretariat for Multidimensional Security that was established in 2005 to enhance secretariat cooperation and coordination on a range of overlapping security-related issues.<sup>54</sup>

The CICTE Secretariat was established in 2002 to support the member states and help them develop the capacity to comply with their international commitments and to implement CICTE's annual Work Plan.<sup>55</sup> Its main purpose is to promote and develop cooperation among OAS member states to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism. States in the region are required to do so in accordance with the principles of the OAS Charter and with the 2002 Inter-American Convention against Terrorism (IACT), and with full respect for the sovereignty of states and the rule of law, including international humanitarian, human rights, and refugee law.

The CICTE Secretariat leverages the financial and technical support of its partners, which include functional organizations and bilateral donors, to offer technical assistance and capacity building training programs to assist OAS member states to prevent, combat, and eliminate terrorism. These programs offer technical assistance, including specialized training, in areas such as border control, financial controls, critical infrastructure protection, legislative assistance and consultations, crisis management exercises, and policy development and coordination. These programs are further concentrated in areas such as port security, aviation security, document security and fraud prevention, immigration and customs, counterterrorism legislation, counterterrorism exercises, cybersecurity, tourism and recreational facilities security, policy development and coordination, and terrorist financing.<sup>56</sup>

Through the work of the CICTE Secretariat, the countries of the region have stepped up their cooperation on a range of terrorism-related issues, such as improving the quality of identification and travel documents, and adopting financial controls to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities. The CICTE Secretariat is working on a plan to strengthen cyber-security in the region, including the establishment of a cyber-security 24/7 alert and warning network for the Americas.<sup>57</sup>

The CICTE Secretariat maintains cooperation relationships with some 30 international, regional, and sub-regional organizations, as well as the private sector. Foremost among these in the UN system are UNODC, ICAO, IMO, the UN Inter-Regional Crime Institute (UNICRI), and most recently the WCO. These relationships and tailored training programs offer an excellent example of how a regional organization can help countries to implement international standards set by UN entities.

As noted above, the CTC/CTED's interactions with CICTE have so far been somewhat limited. However, the CTED Executive Director's briefing to CICTE's Eighth Regular Session in March 2008, which outlined the new, more proactive, tailored, and nuanced approach the CTED will be taking with stakeholders, including organizations such as CICTE, may signal the start of more sustained interaction between the two bodies. Such interactions should include the participation of CTED experts in relevant CICTE training sessions.

### *Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD)*

CICAD works towards controlling the production, trafficking and use of illicit drugs in the region.<sup>58</sup> The Executive Secretariat partners with the CICTE Secretariat and a number of other regional and international organizations, including the UNODC. Its program areas include, *inter alia*, demand reduction, supply reduction, alternative development, anti-money laundering, and institutional development. It is a partner in the Port Security Assistance Program created by CICTE to strengthen the capacity of OAS member states to effectively comply with the security requirements of the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS). Other partners are the Inter-American Committee on Ports (CIP), Transport Canada, the US Coast Guard, and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the US Department of State. The Anti-Money Laundering Unit of the CICAD Executive Secretariat also partners with the CICTE Secretariat on training related to terrorist financing, especially for judges, prosecutors, police, and financial intelligence units.

CICAD's assistance programs which are relevant to implementing the UN Strategy include: regional training seminars for police and customs officials on topics such as control of chemical substances; security of officers and officials; maritime cooperation; profiles of suspicious containers and passengers; inspection of cargo and private sector participation in seaport and airport security; and money-laundering control training programs. Much like CICTE, CICAD has relied on effective partnerships with a range of other multilateral bodies to carry out its mandate including the IADB, UNODC, and the Pan American Health Organization.

### ***The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights***

The protection of human rights in the region, including adherence to human rights norms while fighting terrorism, falls within the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (the IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Court).<sup>59</sup> The decisions of the Court and the IACHR with regard to the protection of human rights as it relates to State action against individuals implicated in terrorist offenses have been cited extensively in the *Digest of jurisprudence of the United Nations and regional organizations on the protection of human rights while countering terrorism*.<sup>60</sup>

Perhaps most importantly, the Court, at the request of an OAS member state, may provide advisory opinions concerning the compatibility of its domestic laws with OAS human rights norms. Access to this important facility by states in the region as they seek to adopt new domestic laws to implement UN Security Council-mandated counterterrorism requirements is not limited to states parties to the Court or states that have accepted its compulsory jurisdiction. Where appropriate, the CTC/CTED should be encouraging states in the region to seek advisory opinions on their counterterrorism legislation and practice through the facilities provided by the Court and/or the IACHR.

The IACHR has convened meetings of government experts "to exchange best practices and national experiences, from a human rights perspective, in adopting counterterrorism measures."<sup>61</sup> Secretariat officials both from the CICTE and IACHR attend the other's annual meetings, although they do not participate in each other's training sessions. Upon the decision of the OAS General Assembly, the commission and CICTE have also collaborated closely in the preparation and consideration of a set of recommendations for the Protection of Human Rights by OAS member states in the Fight Against Terrorism. The 2007 OAS General Assembly directed the Permanent Council to begin consultations with the CICTE and its member states on the

above-mentioned recommendations, which were prepared by the IACHR, with a view to “compil[ing] current international standards based on applicable international law, as well as best practices, for consideration by the [OAS] General Assembly.”<sup>62</sup> This example of cooperation between the human rights and counterterrorism arms of a regional organization, which collaborate in developing best practices, recommendations, or guidelines for its members to follow while countering terrorism, should serve as a best practice for other regional entities.

As this brief overview of the work of the OAS system indicates, the OAS is well positioned to contribute in a range of ways to promote Strategy implementation among its members. It is thus an institution with which the Task Force needs to find as many ways as possible to engage. The onus is on the Task Force in consultation with the OAS Secretariat to determine how best to leverage the mandates of the UN agencies and programs to take advantage of the OAS’s positioning in the region and the operational capacities of its agencies and departments. The countries of the region have ownership in the OAS system and the OAS as an integral part of the region understands well the region’s dynamics, its peculiarities, strengths, and weaknesses. A first step could be a meeting between the OAS Assistant Secretary of Multidimensional Security and the directors of each of the units under his purview, and the head of the UN Task Force and representatives of those UN entities with greatest relevance to the region’s needs. The purpose could be to discuss what should be the priorities for Strategy implementation in the region and the complementary roles that the two organizations should play in helping States in the region address these priorities.

At the more operational level, the CICTE Secretariat offers a best practice in terms of its organization, ability to engage effectively with a wide range of multilateral and bilateral stakeholders, operational modalities, and execution of its counterterrorism capacity building mandate. All of this could guide the CTC/CTED, and the broader Task Force, in helping other regional and sub-regional bodies to develop the necessary counterterrorism architecture to enable them to engage effectively with the UN and other stakeholders, with a view to strengthening their ability not only to promote Strategy implementation among their member states, but hemispheric counterterrorism cooperation more generally.

### ***CFATF and GAFISUD***

The CFATF and GAFISUD are the two FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs) in the Americas. With a combined membership of forty-one countries, each has a small secretariat. Their main objectives are to achieve implementation of and compliance by their members with the FATF 40 Recommendations on money laundering and 9 Special Recommendations on terrorist financing.

The FSRBs undertake mutual evaluations of their members and are able to help them identify areas of deficiencies in their implementation of the Recommendations and help them in meeting international standards. Ongoing mutual evaluation reports have identified a number of deficiencies in some of the countries evaluated. These countries need a significant infusion of technical assistance, training, and financial support in order to meet the required standards. For example, a number of countries in the region still have not adopted the requisite legislation, including implementing legislation, for the International Convention against the Financing of Terrorism nor have in place appropriately operational financial intelligence capacity. To address this and other needs the FSRBs have worked closely with and received support from the Governments of Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Cooperating and Supporting Nations). In addition, the FSRBs have collaborated on a number of programs with the OAS/CICAD, the IADB, the Caribbean Development Bank

(CDB), the Commonwealth Secretariat, the UNODC, the World Bank, IMF, Interpol, FATF, and the Egmont Group in training and other capacity-building programs of their members.

### ***Caribbean Community (CARICOM)***

CARICOM's primary objectives are Caribbean economic integration and development, a common external trade policy, a coordinated foreign policy, and regional security.<sup>63</sup> As previously noted, the CARICOM Secretariat does not include staff dedicated to counterterrorism and this institutional weakness limits the Secretariat's role in helping its members implement counterterrorism measures. Further, CARICOM's Regional Task Force on Crime and Security,<sup>64</sup> an expert group which examines the major causes of crime and recommends approaches to deal with the inter-related problems of crime, illicit drugs and firearms, and terrorism, is not a policy or decision-making body and does not have executive functions.<sup>65</sup> Except in special circumstances, such as the regional cooperation on providing security for Cricket World Cup 2007,<sup>66</sup> execution of security policy recommendations has usually been left to each country to implement individually on the basis of each one's access to resources and expertise. To offset CARICOM's institutional limitations, CARICOM members rely heavily on counterterrorism and security-related bilateral assistance from the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, as well as from international specialized bodies and other partners.. This approach can leave the smaller and less developed countries of the region at a disadvantage in accessing technical assistance in general, and counterterrorism assistance in particular.

A number of counterterrorism and other security-related programs (primarily training) have been provided through the OAS (CICTE and CICAD) and CFATF, as well as the UNODC in cooperation with the OAS and other regional and international bodies. In addition, at the Twenty-Seventh Meeting of the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM in 2006, the CARICOM Implementation Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS) emerged as the implementation arm of the regional architecture for the management of crime and security in the sub-region. It remains to be seen whether IMPACS could play a role in promoting implementation of the UN Strategy in the sub-region.

### ***MERCOSUR***

The five-member trading bloc's primary focus since its inception has been on furthering regional economic integration. However, progress on its economic agenda has stalled as a result of a diversity of national interests among its members and associate members and the related lack of shared understanding on how best to advance on its major goal, i.e., creating a common market, with some observers citing lack of political will among some of its members.<sup>67</sup> With work on its economic priorities largely stalled, the group has still been able to make progress in furthering its non-economic integrationist agenda, including in the field of counterterrorism. For example, following the attacks of 9/11, MERCOSUR established a Standing Working Group on Terrorism in the framework of its meetings of interior ministers. This working group, which holds monthly organizational meetings and is responsible for coordinating the countries' anti-terrorism efforts in the area of intelligence and ensuring efficient contacts and exchange of information, has benefited from contributions from of all the region's intelligence services and security and police forces. In addition, MERCOSUR's Committee on the Prevention of Money-Laundering has prepared a number of agreements and protocols, which have been adopted by MERCOSUR members aimed at enhancing regional cooperation in this area.<sup>68</sup>

While MERCOSUR has had some success in deepening the counterterrorism cooperation among its members, its counterterrorism mandate will need to be strengthened and secretariat

resources enhanced if it is to play a meaningful role in promoting implementation of the UN Strategy in South America and engage on a sustained basis with the UN Task Force in New York.

### ***The Central American Integration System (SICA)***

One of the political cornerstones of SICA, an organization founded in 1991 to promote economic integration among its members, is the 1995 Framework Treaty on Democratic Security and the work of the Central American Security Commission (CASC) and the Defence and Legal Subcommittees, the aim of which is to develop a model for democratic security in the region, through the adoption of common strategies and regional action plans for dealing with the serious threats to the security of citizens in the sub-region. SICA has adopted a series of security-related action plans of relevance to the implementation of the UN Strategy, including ones related to drugs and organized crime.<sup>69</sup>

Of greatest relevance to the UN Strategy, however, is the counterterrorism framework and action plan adopted by the Central American Security Commission in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks largely mirroring the measures included in Security Council Resolution 1373. The Central American Plan for Comprehensive Cooperation to Prevent and Combat Terrorism incorporates decisions “to form national inter-agency committees to coordinate the elaboration of sectoral plans for implementing guidelines and strategic actions; to initiate the Plan’s implementation within 30 days; and to evaluate the sectoral plans on an ongoing basis.”<sup>70</sup> The “actions” involve the exchange of information, the strengthening of security at borders, ports, and airports, increased monitoring and control of migration flows to halt any movement of persons associated with terrorism and the strengthening of criminal legislation.

With both the CASC and SICA General Secretariat lacking the necessary resources or mandate to work with its members to implement this Plan, however, the burden has fallen entirely on the member states, which themselves have significant capacity needs and are faced with other pressing priorities. The SICA institutional limitations have also hindered efforts to reach out to bilateral and multilateral donors in order to build the partnerships necessary to strengthen counterterrorism capacities in the sub-region. Therefore, much like MERCOSUR, the Central American sub-regional mechanism will need to be strengthened if one hopes for it to play a meaningful role in promoting UN Strategy implementation in Central America.

### ***Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)***

The IADB, with membership of forty-seven countries is the main source of multilateral financing in the Americas for economic, social, and institutional development. With its loans and grants targeting financing for development projects and supporting strategies to reduce poverty, expand growth, and increase trade and investment, the IADB is instrumental in implementing the UN Strategy. The IADB has a mandate to devote at least half of its operations and forty percent of its lending volume to social programs that promote social equity and target the poor. Increasing the IADB’s grant funding facility, which is currently a small fraction of its loan portfolio, could potentially become a source for increased funding for efforts to reduce poverty in less developed countries of the region thereby helping to reduce conditions regarded as conducive to the spread of terrorism.<sup>71</sup>

## **V. The role of international specialized bodies and organizations in promoting UN Strategy implementation in the region**

There are a number of specialized and other international organizations that are actively engaged with OAS countries on issues that are relevant to the implementation of the UN Strategy. For example, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the World Customs Organization (WCO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) have developed, and will continue to develop new security standards and programs, at the urging and with the assistance of developed countries. Many of these new standards deal with security in general, but there have been a plethora of new ones to deal specifically with security in the context of the terrorist threat. These international specialized agencies offer standards and best practices in areas such as, travel documents issuance and security, and aviation and airport facilities security (ICAO),<sup>72</sup> international supply chain security (WCO),<sup>73</sup> maritime and port facilities security (IMO),<sup>74</sup> and tracking and policing international criminal networks and terrorists, and tracking lost and stolen travel documents (Interpol).<sup>75</sup> Implementing these new international standards requires human expertise and significant financial resources to purchase and operate high-cost, technologically advanced security equipment the cost of which some countries in the region either cannot afford or find disproportionate to their value to small economies.<sup>76</sup>

The Strategy highlights the importance of the capacity-building and standard-setting work these functional bodies perform, which is of particular importance in a region where there are a number of small island states, where nearly all states are highly dependent on international trade, and many lack the necessary human and/or financial resources to be able to meet these standards. Many of these functional organizations, which are represented on the Task Force, have a presence in the Americas through which they provide different forms of technical assistance and engage in varying degrees of cooperation with the OAS and sub-regional bodies on the ground.

### ***World Bank/IMF***

The IMF and World Bank are not only making important contributions to reducing poverty and promoting development and good governance, which are central components of the Strategy, but are also contributing more specifically to the region's efforts to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism. They conduct joint assessments of member countries' compliance with the FATF standards under the Financial Sector and Offshore Financial Center Assessment Programs. These programs aim to increase the effectiveness of efforts to promote the soundness of financial systems in member economies. Supported by experts from a range of national agencies and standard-setting bodies, activities carried out under these programs seek to identify the strengths and vulnerabilities of a member economy; to determine how key sources of risk are being managed; and to ascertain the sector's developmental and technical capacity. So far eight countries in the Americas have been reviewed under the Financial Sector Assessment program and another four under the Offshore Financial Center Assessment Program.<sup>77</sup> The IMF/World Bank also provide technical assistance on implementing anti-money laundering/combating the financing of terrorism legislation at the request of member states. Within the Americas the IMF has established a sub-regional training center in the Caribbean (Caribbean Region Technical Assistance Centre) located in Barbados in which twenty countries and territories participate.<sup>78</sup> The IMF and World Bank also work with the two FSRBs in the region sharing assessments and on training and implementation.

### *Commonwealth Secretariat*

The Commonwealth Secretariat (ComSec)<sup>79</sup> undertakes a number of programs in the Caribbean sub-region<sup>80</sup> in areas such as drafting counterterrorism legislation and capacity building and measures to combat corruption that are relevant to implementation of the UN Strategy. Its programs also help states in the Caribbean sub-region develop capacities to deal with transnational crime, in particular in areas of international cooperation, such as extradition, mutual legal assistance, and cross-border restraint and confiscation of proceeds of crime.<sup>81</sup> In addition, the ComSec develops programs to assist its member countries in areas relating to the rule of law and the promotion of democratic values, and in policy development on the administration of, and access to, justice and the speedy and effective resolution of disputes. It further collaborates with other international donors (in particular Canada and the United Kingdom) and specialized bodies in the conduct of its programs in the region, including collaboration with ICAO on conducting aviation security audits in a number of CARICOM states.

### **VI. The Role of the United States and other Bilateral Donors in Furthering UN Strategy Implementation Efforts in the Americas**

In addition to functional organizations in the region, there is an added advantage of having the presence of donor countries active in the region both as it relates to development and security-related assistance. Key donors include the United States and Canada, France, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Italy. As a result, Strategy implementation efforts in the region stand to benefit from partnering with these donor states, and in particular with the United States, which has developed and is implementing a number of security-related programs throughout the region, driven in part by the US desire and commitment to secure its southern flank.

The United States regards the countries of the Americas as “the frontline of American national security.”<sup>82</sup> As part of its national security strategy, the US holds that its own security requires that it work “with regional partners to make multi-lateral institutions such as the OAS and the IADB more effective and better able to foster concerted action to address threats that may arise to the region’s stability, security, prosperity, or democratic progress.”<sup>83</sup> The United States’ “four strategic priorities for the region: bolstering security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, and investing in people”<sup>84</sup> are in keeping with the goals of the UN Strategy.

The US is investing heavily to secure its southern border with Mexico; has imposed new security travel requirements from countries within the Western Hemisphere to the United States;<sup>85</sup> and the US Coast Guard and US Customs have actively pursued new security requirements in port facilities and Customs throughout the Americas, including by providing assistance to some countries to implement IMO’s ISPS Code.<sup>86</sup> The US has added security as a component of its Third Border Initiative with CARICOM states and the Dominican Republic.<sup>87</sup>

In addition, because of its concerns about terrorist fundraising in the TBA, the US accepted the invitation from Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay to join their existing mechanism to tackle arms and drugs smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of contraband goods in the sub-region. The 3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security brings together national counterterrorism officials from each of the countries with a view to strengthening the capacity of the three South American countries “to address cross-border crime and thwart money laundering and potential terrorist fundraising activities.”<sup>88</sup> As noted above, despite this cooperation, sharp differences remain between the US and the “3” over the existence of terrorism active in this vulnerable area.

Canada is also a major provider of counterterrorism capacity-building assistance in the region both bilaterally and through multilateral and international functional organizations such as the OAS and IMO. Through its Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building (CTCB) assistance program, Canada provides \$15 million annually for “training, funding, equipment, and technical and legal assistance to other states to enable them to prevent and respond to terrorist activity, within international counter-terrorism and human rights norms, standards and obligations.”<sup>89</sup> The program focuses on seven areas, including border security, transportation security, combating terrorism financing, cyber security, and protecting critical infrastructure, and is managed by a committee of relevant federal agencies that seek to take a 'whole-of-government' approach to capacity building.<sup>90</sup>

Since 2006, Canada has provided substantial resources through the CTCB to CICTE training programs in port and airport security, document security, and terrorist financing. In February 2007, Transport Canada formed the PSAP with other partners, as noted above. Canada is actively considering the formation of other partnerships with the OAS to leverage resources and enhance impact in the resource.<sup>91</sup>

Both the US and Canada have provided financial and technical support to the OAS's development, crime, and security initiatives. Given the central role that these two states play in supporting programs of the OAS and other multilateral and functional bodies that have relevance to the Strategy, it will be important for the Task Force to engage regularly with them, as well as the other potential bilateral donors, as it seeks to promote activities aimed at furthering Strategy implementation in the Americas.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> The LACR is comprised of all of the countries of the Americas, except Canada and the United States.

<sup>2</sup> The members of the CFATF are Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Turks and Caicos Islands, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.

<sup>3</sup> The members of GAFISUD are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

<sup>4</sup> The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has fifteen member states – Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago – and five associate members – Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, and Turks and Caicos Islands.

<sup>5</sup> MERCOSUR, “the Common Market of the South,” is the largest trading bloc in South America. Its full members are Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Its five associate members are Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.

<sup>6</sup> SICA’s members are Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama.

<sup>7</sup> The 3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security is comprised of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, plus the United States.

<sup>8</sup> Major terrorist acts in the Americas (other than in the United States) pre-9/11 include: 1976 – bombing of a Cuban airline off the coast of Barbados, killing seventy-three; 1992 – bombs exploded at the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, killing twenty-two people; 1994 – bombing of the Argentine Israeli Mutual Association building, eighty-six died; 1996 – the Japanese Embassy in Peru was seized by rebels who held seventy-two dignitaries for more than four months.

<sup>9</sup> Arlene B. Tickner, “Latin America and the Caribbean: Domestic and Transnational Insecurity,” *Coping with Crisis Working Paper, International Peace Academy*, February 2007, p.6.

<sup>10</sup> For information on conflicts in the region see the International Crisis Group reports on the Latin America and the Caribbean: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?l=1&id=1094&sr=2>.

<sup>11</sup> Tickner, p.6.

<sup>12</sup> Compton Bourne (President, Caribbean Development Bank), “Caribbean Development in Troubled Times: Trends and Prospects in the Regional and International Economy,” Fourth Lecture in the Caribbean Lecture Series The Atlanta University Centre Atlanta, Georgia, 10 April, 2003 p.4, [http://www.caribank.org/Pres\\_statements.nsf/Atlanta/\\$File/AtlantaUniversity.pdf?OpenElement](http://www.caribank.org/Pres_statements.nsf/Atlanta/$File/AtlantaUniversity.pdf?OpenElement).

<sup>13</sup> For example, the Countries of the Caribbean Basin lost some 119 of their nationals in the World Trade Center. Data compiled by the Editor from embassies and consulates in the US. Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, Ed., *Caribbean Security in the Age of Terror: Challenge and Change*, (Ian Randle Publishers, Kingston and Miami, 2004).

<sup>14</sup> Examples include the US Container Security Initiative, the Megaports Initiative, and travel documents requirements under the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative, the IMO’s ISPS Code, ICAO’s new security standards for travel documents, and WCO safe trade facilitation program.

<sup>15</sup> Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism (2006): Western Hemisphere Overview. See also, CRS Report for Congress, “Latin America: Terrorism Issues” January 8, 2007, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RS21049.pdf>, and Chris Zambelis, “The Threat of Islamic Radicalism in Suriname” *Terrorism Monitor* Volume 4, Issue 21, 2 November 2006, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370193>.

<sup>16</sup> Philip K. Abbott, “Terrorist Threat in the Tri-Border Area: Myth or Reality?,” *Military Review*, September-October, 2004.

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- <sup>17</sup> John C.K. Daly, "The Latin Connection," *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 3:1 October 2003, at [http://www.jamestown.org/publications\\_details.php?volume\\_id=391&issue\\_id=2877&article\\_id=23407](http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=391&issue_id=2877&article_id=23407)
- <sup>18</sup> U.S. State Department Country Reports on Terrorism (2006): Western Hemisphere Overview
- <sup>19</sup> "Three S. American Countries Tell U.S. it's Wrong About Terrorists," *EFE News Service*, 7 December 2006.
- <sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>21</sup> Douglas Farah, "The Growing Terrorism Challenges From Latin America," *The International Assessment and Strategy Center*, 18 February 2007, [http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.149/pub\\_detail.asp#](http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.149/pub_detail.asp#).
- <sup>22</sup> Frank C. Urbancic, Jr. Testimony before the House of Representatives Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Committee on International Relations, Washington, DC, 13 July 2006.
- <sup>23</sup> Chris Zambelis, "Radical Islam in Latin America," *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol. 3:23 2, December 2005, <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369844>.
- <sup>24</sup> Douglas Farah, "The Growing Terrorism Challenges From Latin America," *The International Assessment and Strategy Center*, 18 February 2007, [http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.149/pub\\_detail.asp#](http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.149/pub_detail.asp#).
- <sup>25</sup> "Venezuela Condemns Colombia Over Killing," *International Herald Tribune*, 3 March 2008, p. 6.
- <sup>26</sup> Jailed in Venezuela in 1976 after being found guilty of bombing the Cuban plane, in 1985 Posada escaped. Twenty years later, in May 2005, he was detained by US immigration officials after allegedly entering the country illegally, via Mexico. In 2007, a US judge's decision to dismiss charges of immigration fraud against him have angered Cuba and Venezuela who are both continuing to push for his extradition. "Profile: Cuban 'Plane Bomber,'" *BBC News*, 9 May 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4558777.stm>.
- <sup>27</sup> Rex A. Hudson et al, "An Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups," Library of Congress, May 2002 [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs\\_Extrems.pdf](http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/NarcsFundedTerrs_Extrems.pdf).
- <sup>28</sup> US State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65462.pdf>.
- <sup>29</sup> In 2006, a US DEA official stated that "in Colombia, the FARC and its annual revenue is second only to the oil companies who work there." "Department of Justice Transcript of Attorney General's Press Conference Announcing Charges Against 50 Leaders of Narco-Terrorist FARC in Colombia," Washington, DC, 22 March 2006, see <http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr032206c.html>. In the late 1990s, the FARC alone is said to have earned \$600,000 per year. James Reynolds, "FARC: Power Versus Principle," *BBC News*, 31 July 1999, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/407915.stm>
- <sup>30</sup> For information on and analysis of the impact and effectiveness of Plan Colombia see, e.g., Danna Harmon, "Plan Colombia: Big Gains but the Cocaine Still Flows," *Christian Science Monitor*, 28 September 2006, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0928/p01s03-woam.html> and Stephanie Hansen, "Colombia's 'Drugs and Thugs,'" *CFR Daily Analysis*, 30 August 2006, [http://www.cfr.org/publication/11313/colombias\\_drugs\\_and\\_thugs.html](http://www.cfr.org/publication/11313/colombias_drugs_and_thugs.html).
- <sup>31</sup> Joy Olsen, "US Military Programs with Latin America and their Impact on Human Security," United Nations Institute for Disarmament Affairs, New York, 2002.
- <sup>32</sup> Thomas G. Costa and Gaston H. Schulmeister, "The Puzzle of the Iguazu Tri-Border Area: Many Questions Answered and Few Answers Regarding Organized Crime and Terrorism Links," *Global Crime*, vol.8, no.1, February 2007, 26. For a general discussion of the links between terrorism and crime, see, e.g., David E. Kaplan, "Paying for Terror: How jihadist groups are using organized-crime tactics – and profits – to finance attacks on targets around the world," *U.S. News & World Report*, 12 December 2005, available at <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/051205/5terror.htm> and Yvon Dandurand and Vivienne Chin, "Links Between Terrorism and Other Forms of Crime," A report Submitted to Foreign Affairs Canada and the UNODC, April 2004, available at [http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/TNOC\\_LINKS\\_STUDY\\_REPORT.pdf](http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/TNOC_LINKS_STUDY_REPORT.pdf).
- <sup>33</sup> US Treasury, Prepared Remarks of Pat O'Brien, Assistant Secretary Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes before the U.S.-Latin America Private Sector Dialogue on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, Bogota, Columbia, 2007, see <http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp346.htm>.
- <sup>34</sup> See for example: Stephen J. Randall, "United States-Latin American Relations in The Post-Cold War, Post-9-11 Years," *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*, Summer 2004, Vol. 6, Issue 4, Centre for

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Military and Strategic Studies, Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, 2004; and “US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Struggles to Justify its Role in War on Terror,” Council on Hemispheric Affairs, <http://www.coha.org/2004/09/02/us-southern-command-southcom-struggles-to-justify-its-role-in-the-war-on-terror/>.

<sup>35</sup> “Declaration of Bridgetown the Multidimensional Approach to Hemispheric Security,” OAS AG/DEC. 27 (XXXII-O/02), adopted at the fourth plenary session held on June 4, 2002.

<sup>36</sup> There are a number of UN peacekeeping and other activities related to addressing the longstanding conflicts in the sub-region which are relevant to elements of the Strategy, but which will not be addressed in this paper due to space limitations.

<sup>37</sup> UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), para. 4.

<sup>38</sup> UN Security Council, “Organizational plan for the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate,” 8 February 2008, S/2008/80, available at <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/cted.shtml>.

<sup>39</sup> “The Caribbean Regions Comes under Scrutiny,” Global Agenda, *Economist.com*, 6 June 2007, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup> Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Suriname, Uruguay have not submitted reports to the 1267 Committee.

<sup>41</sup> UN Office of Drugs and Crime, “Summary of TPB Achievements in Latin America and the Caribbean,” February 2008 [copy on file with Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation]. Partly as a result of the TPB’s efforts, the LACR has seen twelve new ratifications of the universal legal instruments against terrorism since April 2006, four new national laws adopted and eight draft laws tabled before the legislature, and the training or briefing of more than 900 criminal justice officials on issues surround international cooperation on terrorism matters

<sup>42</sup> Declaration of Santo Domingo, “Ministerial Conference on International Cooperation against Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime,” Santo Domingo, March 22, 2007, para. 5,

[http://www.cicte.oas.org/Database\\_/DECLARATION%20Sto%20Domingo%20-%20ENG.doc](http://www.cicte.oas.org/Database_/DECLARATION%20Sto%20Domingo%20-%20ENG.doc).

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> The three South and Central America countries that are not parties to at least ten of the international anti-terrorism instruments are: Colombia – nine, Dominican Republic – three, and Venezuela – seven. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism at: <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/83238.htm>.

<sup>45</sup> The eight CARICOM member states that have ratified or acceded to fewer than ten of the international anti-terrorism instruments are: Antigua & Barbuda – seven, The Bahamas – eight, Belize – eight, Guyana – six, Haiti – six, St. Kitts & Nevis – five, Saint Lucia – six, and Suriname – six. U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism

<sup>46</sup> U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, International Conventions and Protocols on Terrorism.

<sup>47</sup> CICTE Secretariat’s website at: <http://www.oas.org/rev/en/about/History.asp>.

<sup>48</sup> Information on the organized crime convention and its protocols, as well as UNODC technical assistance programs in this area, is available at [www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized\\_crime/index.html](http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized_crime/index.html).

<sup>49</sup> United Nations Development Programme, Annual Report 2007, available at: <http://www.undp.org/publications/annualreport2007/IAR07-ENG.pdf>.

<sup>50</sup> UNESCO Field Offices in LACR are in: Brazil, Guatemala, Cuba (Cluster and Regional Bureau), Jamaica (Cluster), Peru, Mexico, Uruguay (Cluster and Regional Bureau), Haiti, Ecuador (Cluster), Costa Rica (Cluster), and Chile (Regional Bureau). Information available at: [http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL\\_ID=34016&URL\\_DO=DO\\_TOPIC&URL\\_SECTION=201.HTML](http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=34016&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.HTML).

<sup>51</sup> Information on UNESCO available at: <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001473/147330e.pdf>.

<sup>52</sup> Ticker, p.8.

<sup>53</sup> The CICTE is known by its Spanish acronym Comité Interamericano contra el Terrorismo (CICTE).

<sup>54</sup> For further information see

[http://www.oas.org/SGInfAnual/2007/English/10\\_SECRETARIAT\\_MULTIDIMENSIONAL\\_SECURITY.pdf](http://www.oas.org/SGInfAnual/2007/English/10_SECRETARIAT_MULTIDIMENSIONAL_SECURITY.pdf).

<sup>55</sup> For detailed information on the current CICTE Work Plan see, <http://www.oas.org/rev/en/About/Structure.asp>.

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<sup>56</sup> In total, the CICTE Secretariat has conducted 61 training courses and technical assistance missions in 2007, benefiting some 2,692 participants in the hemisphere. Report on the Activities of the Secretariat of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism, Eighth Regional Session, 5-7 March 2008, Washington, DC, OAS/Ser.L/X.2.8.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>59</sup> Both institutions were created by the American Convention on Human Rights.

<sup>60</sup> Digest of jurisprudence of the United Nations and regional organizations on the protection of human rights while countering terrorism, Compiled by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva (New York and Geneva, 2003).

<sup>61</sup> Santiago A. Canton, presentation before the International Commission of Jurists Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights, Washington, DC, 7 September 2006, <http://ejp.icj.org/IMG/IACHR.pdf>.

<sup>62</sup> OAS General Assembly Resolution 2271, para. 6.

<sup>63</sup> CARICOM has fifteen member states and five associate members. Its membership includes ten English-speaking independent island states in the Caribbean, plus Guyana and Suriname in South America, Belize in Central America, Haiti, and Montserrat (a self-governing British territory).

<sup>64</sup> The Conference of Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) at its Twenty-Second Meeting held in Nassau, The Bahamas in July 2001, agreed to establish a Regional Task Force on Crime and Security. Information available at:

[http://www.caricom.org/jsp/archives/crime\\_and\\_security.htm](http://www.caricom.org/jsp/archives/crime_and_security.htm).

<sup>65</sup> Security policy and decision-making in CARICOM is carried out by its Council of Ministers Responsible for National Security and Law Enforcement as well as policy-making at the Heads of Government level.

<sup>66</sup> The Cricket World Cup 2007 regional security approach was successfully employed by nine of CARICOM member states to create a seamless security space which created temporarily a common external border employing state of the art technology and methodologies in cooperation and assistance from bi-lateral partners – Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Interpol

<sup>67</sup> Event Summary, “Strategic Scenarios and Interstate Relations in MERCOSUR,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 15 May 2007, available at

[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic\\_id=1425&fuseaction=topics.event\\_summary&event\\_id=235420](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1425&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=235420).

<sup>68</sup> For information regarding the counterterrorism initiatives in MERCOSUR see the reports of MERCOSUR countries to the CTC, available at <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/countryreports.shtml>.

<sup>69</sup> For more information on SICA see Rolando A. Guevara Alvarado, “Central America: Integrating into the Future” in *Central American Integration: What’s Next? – The Integration Process in Central America and the Role of the European Union*, available at

[http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CACM\\_EU/Studies/integen1203\\_e.pdf](http://www.sice.oas.org/TPD/CACM_EU/Studies/integen1203_e.pdf).

<sup>70</sup> See Honduras’ first report to the CTC, 30 November 2001, available at

<http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/countryreports/reportA.shtml>.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* By the end of 2006, the IADB had approved over \$145 billion in loans and \$2.2 billion in grants.

<sup>72</sup> ICAO standards and programs on travel documents and aviation security facilitation are available at:

<http://www.icao.int/atb/sfbranch/index.asp?>

<sup>73</sup> The WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, when implemented should “contribute positively to economic and social development, act as deterrent to international terrorism, secure revenue collections and promote trade facilitation world-wide.” Further details are available at:

<http://www.wcoomd.org>.

<sup>74</sup> A list of the IMO conventions on safety and security are available at:

[http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic\\_id=260](http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=260).

<sup>75</sup> Information on Interpol’s programs are available at: <http://www.interpol.int>.

<sup>76</sup> Twenty-five of the thirty-five countries in the Western Hemisphere have indicated their intentions to implement WCO’s June 2005 Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade. “Members who have expressed their intention to implement the WCO Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade.” <http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/pdf/WCO2.pdf>. All of the countries in the Western Hemisphere except Costa Rica and El Salvador are parties to the International Convention for the Safety of

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Life at Sea, 1974 and are therefore required to implement the ISPS Code. IMO Status of Conventions by Country. Available online at: [http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic\\_id=248](http://www.imo.org/Conventions/mainframe.asp?topic_id=248).

<sup>77</sup> Under the auspices of its Financial Sector Assessment Program, the IMF has conducted assessments of Barbados, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay. See the website of the IMF Financial Sector Assessment Program at:

<http://www.imf.org/external/np/fsap/fsap.asp>.

<sup>78</sup> See <http://www.cartac.com.bb/pageselect.cfm?page=6>.

<sup>79</sup> The Commonwealth Secretariat is the operational body of the Commonwealth of Nations which consists of fifty-three independent states (UK and fifty-two former colonies of the UK).

<sup>80</sup> Haiti and Suriname are not members of ComSec.

<sup>81</sup> Commonwealth Secretariat Criminal Section, at:

[http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/140504/criminal\\_law](http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/140504/criminal_law).

<sup>82</sup> “The National Security Strategy of the United States,” March 2006, available at:

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nss/2006.pdf>, p. 37.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> The Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI) is a result of the Intelligence Reform and Prevention Act 2004 requiring all travelers to present a passport or other document that denotes identity and citizenship when entering the US. It went into effect as of 23 January 2007 for all persons entering or re-entering the US by air. More information available at:

[http://travel.state.gov/travel/cbpmc/cbpmc\\_2223.html#](http://travel.state.gov/travel/cbpmc/cbpmc_2223.html#).

<sup>86</sup> A full description of the US Customs and Border Protection programs are available at:

<http://www.cbp.gov> (accessed 3 January 2008)

<sup>87</sup> USAID Caribbean Regional Overview, available at: <http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2003/lac/crp>.

<sup>88</sup> U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism, Western Hemisphere Overview at:

<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82735.htm>.

<sup>89</sup> Website of the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade: [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign\\_policy/internationalcrime/ctcbp/menu-en.asp](http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/internationalcrime/ctcbp/menu-en.asp).

<sup>90</sup> “Government of Canada Supports International Marine Security Efforts,” Transport Canada Press Release, 23 June 2006, <http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2006/06-gc009e.htm>.

<sup>91</sup> Spain has also become a major provider of financial resources to the OAS since 2006 and funds CICTE and CICAD programs and several Spanish ministries coordinate seminars for Latin American countries at its training centers in the hemisphere in conjunction with the CICTE Secretariat and UNICRI.

Consideration is currently being given to provide technical assistance in partnership with the OAS.